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Introduction
In Nakamura [3] , a necessary and sufficient condition was provided for simple games to have a nonempty core for any possible combination of players' preferences, in case the number of alternatives is finite. Recently, Ferejohn and McKe1vey [2] studied a necessary condition for a social choice function satisfying stable set property to exist. The purpose of this paper is to show the condition given by Nakamura in [3] is also a necessar¥ and sufficient condition that simple games have a unique stable set for any combination of preferences in case of finite number of alternatives, and moreover to· present a necessary and sufficient condition that proper simple games with finite number of alternatives have at least one stable set.
After reviewing basic definitions relating to simple games to be used in this paper in Section 2, we will provide some preliminary theorems and lemmas in Section 3. In Section 4, we will show the condition given by Nakamura in [3] is also a necessary and sufficient condition that a unique stable set exist.
In Section 5, we will describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of stable sets for proper simple games. Several discussions will be Let n be a nonempty set of alternatives. Throughout this paper. n is assumed to be a finite set. Le .• In I < co where 1nl denotes a cardinality of n. Let D denote a set of all weak order preference relations on n. i.e .
• complete. reflexive. and transitive binary preference relations on n. Let RN '" {Ri} iEN where Ri E D for all i t N. and ])N be a set of all such RN. For any
x. YEn. we define P and I • for any i t N. by x P Y +-+ (x Ri y and 'V y Ri x). and x li y +-+ (x Ri y and y Ri x). where 'V denotes a negation. We easily notice that pi and Ii are both transitive. and pi is irreflexive and asymmetric. Here we remark that we could develop our theory based on acyclic strict preference relations on n as was done in Nakamura [3] . (i), (ii) are called internal, and external stability, respectively.
Preliminary Theorems and Lemmas
We first state three theorems due to von Neumann and Morgenstern [6] ,
Richardson [5] , and Nakamura [3] .
Theorem 3.1 (von Neumann and Morgenstern [6] ) . Let G = (N,W) be a simple and n be a finite set. Take N N Then we have the following: game any RED . Now we will prepare some lemmas which will be used in the following sections. All the proofs of the following lemmas will be given in the appendix. N 'V X dom(R ) y for any x € n -n' and any y € n.
Uniqueness of Stable Sets
In this section, we will show that l:he condition given in Theorem 3.3 is also a necessary and sufficient condition that a unique stable set exist for any RN € DN. 
Existence of Stable Sets for Proper Simple Games
In this section, we will describe a necessary and sufficient· condition
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Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated stable sets for simple games with finite set of alternatives. We have shown that the condition given by Nakamura in [3] for the existence of a nonempty core is also a necessary and sufficient condition that there exist a unique stable set for any combination of players' preferences, and moreover described a necessary and sufficient condition that there exist at least one stable set in case the game is proper. ferences such as studied in Ishikawa and. Nakamura [1] and Polishchuk [4] , we must investigate such cases.
This problem. together with the properties of stable sets for simple games having infinite number of alternatives, will be studied in future papers. Using the id~a given in Nakamura [3] , define Ri E: D for ea~h i E: N in the following manner. Take any i E: N. Since n{s Ip=l, ... ,k} = 0, there is p i some p such that i i Sp Let Sp* be one of such Sp' and define R by, i x p + l P xp for all p y. p* -1 (mod k), i.e., i pi ... pi pi i i pi xp*_l p x p *_2 xl ~ P .
•. P xp*+l x p *, x Ii Y for any x, y £ n -n', and for any other x, y £ 5'2, define Ri so that Ri may be a weak order.
Let RN = {Ri}. N' From the definition of Ri above, we have for any i £ N,
1£
x pi x for any x E n' and any x £ n -n', p p and i x I y for any x, y £ n -n'.
Hence we easily obtain (ii) and (iii). Now we will show (i). First we will prove the sufficiency. Take any x £ n', and any i £ S where x = ~(S). Since i £ S , we must have i t S p p p P i P i q for some q ; p. Therefore from the construction of R above, we have x P x 1 N P p-(mod k).
For details, see Nakamura [3] . This shows that x dom(R) x 1 since p p-P Therefore the sufficiency holds.
To show the necessity, we assume that there are some x and x such that 
For any i E N, define
x pli x for any x E n" and any x E n -n", . Therefore we have a set {x1' .
•. '~_2,x1} which forms a cycle w.r.t. dom(R"N), which contradicts Lemma 3.1 since v(G) = k, Hence 'V Xl N dom(R' ) x k ' and thus the necessity of (i) is proved. Q.E.D.
